THIE INTELLECTUAL PREPARATION FOR TIIE CANON OF 1215 AGAINST ORDEALS BY JOHN W. BALDWIN
AMONG the most important of the deliberations of the Fourth Lateran Council convened by Pope Innocent III in 1215 was canon 18, which dealt with the problem of ordeals.' In the general context of prohibiting clerics from involving themselves in judicial decisions which resulted in the shedding of blood, the pope and his assembled bishops spoke authoritatively against judicial proofs by ordeals. These practices were divided into two classes: the unilateral, represented by the hot and cold water and the hot iron trials, and the bilateral, represented by the judicial duel. The first category of unilateral ordeals was merely removed from ecclesiastical auspices by forbidding priests to bless or consecrate the elements. Their use, however, in secular justice was not specifically disallowed. In the second category of bilateral ordeals the Council renewed the censures of former councils against judicial duels.2 In the light of canonical tradition this prohibition most likely envisaged secular as well as ecclesiastical justice.
Historians of ordeals generally consider the Council of 1215 to be the turning point in the disappearance of these customary practices from European law.' In the realm of legal practice the prohibitions of Innocent III had immediate and significant effect against certain unilateral proofs at least in England, Normandy, and Denmark.4 Although such customary trials antedated the Christian era, in mediaeval practice the blessing and consecration of the elements by the clergy played an important part in their operation. Withdrawal of the clergy placed serious handicaps on their popular effectiveness.5 Trial by battle was practiced more tenaciously, particularly because it was the customary proof in cases involving serfdom,6 but King Louis IX's famous ordinance abolishing judicial duels in the French domain was obviously inspired by ecclesiastical precedent.7 Likewise, Emperor Frederick II forbade both kinds of customary proofs throughout his lands in Sicily, although religious influence is not immediately apparent.8 To be sure, neither unilateral nor bilateral ordeals disappeared altogether from judicial practice; note the persistence of the water ordeal in witches' trials as late as the seventeenth century. Nor was the Lateran Council solely responsible for the disappearance of ordeals in practice. Their decline must be viewed in the context of a general movement towards more rational legal procedure as exemplified by the use of the inquest in ecclesiastical and French law, the development of jury trial in English law, and the appearance of merchant law throughout Europe.
In the development of the church's legal position towards ordeals the canon of 1215 has even greater significance. Prior to 1215 two points of view concerning the matter may be discerned in the canons of councils and the decretals of popes. Against such practices authoritative statements may be found as early as the popes of the ninth century9 or the Emperor Constantine.10 These prohibitions were renewed at various times by the councils and the papacy up through the twelfth century. On the other side, as early as the eighth century certain councils under the pressure of legal practice published a number of canons which permitted various types of ordeals and were preserved in collections of church law.11 XVhile succeeding popes and councils were usually unfavorable to these practices, on occasion they could be found admitting exceptions to the general prohibition. As late as the eleventh and twelfth centuries Popes Gregory VII, 6 For the theoretical foundations which supported the practice of both bilateral and unilateral ordeals in mediaeval society see the discussion of Paul Rousset, "La croyance en la justice immanente a l'epoque feodale," Le Moyen Age, LIV (1948) , 235 if. 6 Pierre Petot, "La preuve du servage en Champagne," Revue historique de droitfranQais et 4tranger, xiii (1930) 9 Among the more important examples, Pope Nicholas I in 867 prohibited the judicial duel in the affair of King Lothair II and Queen Teutberga, although he countenanced the ordeal of hot water. Jaffe-Loewenfeld, Regesta pontificum Romnanorum (Leipzig, 1885), no. 2872; Gratian, Decretum, C.2 q.5 c.22 Monomachiam (references in Gratian will be cited, as here, solely by the method of allegation approved by the Institute of Research and Study in Medieval Canon Law). Pope Stephen V between 886 and 889 prohibited unilateral ordeals such as hot iron and cold water in a case of infanticide. Jaffe-Loevenfeld, no. 3443; C.2 q.5 c.20 Consului8ti. Although the pope actually misunderstood the nature of such ordeals, thinking them to be means of torture to produce confession rather than evidence in themselves, the wording of his decretal imposed a general censure. 10 Constantine's prohibition of gladiatorial contests: Cod. 11.44.1 Cruenta. 1 A convenient list of these councils may be found in Leitmaier, Die Kirche, pp. 38-40.
Eugenius III, and Alexander III permitted ordeals in special instances.'2 Even Pope Innocent III prior to the Council of 1215 was ambivalent on the subject.'3 After the pronouncement of 1215, however, the authoritative stand of the church against customary proofs was firm.14 In 1222 Pope Honorius III cleared up any ambiguity in the Lateran decrees by extending the prohibition of unilateral ordeals specifically into secular law.'5 It is true that the frequent reissuing of the censures by later popes and councils indicated that the church was having difficulty in enforcing its stand in practice, but in theory the official statements held true to the position of 1215. In theory, even more than in practice, the Fourth Lateran Council of Pope Innocent III may be considered as marking the beginning of the end of ordeals in European law.
The hesitant attitude of popes and councils towards ordeals before 1215 suiggests a certain amount of debate within the intellectual circles of the church. The decisiveness of the position of 1215 suggests significant preparation by those who opposed the customary practices. Undoubtedly this intellectual debate and preparation took place in the growing movement of schools and universities in the twelfth century, particularly those at Bologna and Paris. To appreciate the issues of the debate and the solutions attained, let us examine the teachings of the faculties of Roman law, canon law, and theology at Paris and Bologna in the century preceding the Lateran Council. Such an inquiry will illuminate the intellectual background for the decree against ordeals in general and may offer some suggestions of influence on the role of Pope Innocent III in particular.
Since the revival of Roman law studies at Bologna in the early twelfth century the mediaeval Romanists generally ignored the whole problem of ordeals. Such customary proofs were non-Roman in origin and therefore of little interest to the student of Roman law. However, certain manuals on the procedure of judicial (luels do appear among the writings of the Romanists. Among these are a treatise falsely attributed to Hlugo of Porta Ravennate and another written by Roifredus of Benevento (d. 1248); both writings are clearly of Lombard origin.'6 From the early Middle Ages the Lombards were reputed to be strong advocates of combat as a means of deciding many legal points.'7 Both pseudo-Hugo and Roffredus appear to have written their treatises as Lombardists and, as far as is known, made 12 Cf. Nottarp, Gottesurteilstudien, pp. 340-342. For additional references to Eugenius III and Alexander III, see below, n. 111, n. 97, n. 122, n. 123. 13 Nottarp, Gottesurteilstudien, pp. 143, 144, 342, 343. 14 An exception may be found in Pope Gregory IX's renewal of the statutes of Benevento which recognized trials of hot iron, water, and duels. Ibid., p. 144. 15 Pope Gregory IX, Decretales (hereafter cited as X), 5.35.3 Dilectifilii; Augustus Potthast, Regesta pontificum Romanorum (Berlin. 1874). no. 6910. 16 Sumnmula de pugna et modis purgationum criminati in Augusto Gaudenzi, Bibliotheca iuridica medii aevi (Bologna, 1888), i, 3-6; Summa de pugna in Patetta, Le ordalie, pp. 480-492. For a general discussioii see Ilermann Kantorowicz, "De pugna: La letteratura longobardistica sul duello giudiziario," Studi di storia e diritto in onore di Enrico Besta (Milan, 1931) , ii, 3-25. 17 In 731 King Liutprand complained that he was powerless to abolish judicial duels because they were so deeply ingrained in Lombard custom. Liutprandi Leges, Anni XIX, c.118 in Franz Beyerle, ed., Die Gesetze der Langobarden (VVeimar, 1947), 282. Cf. Nottarp, Gottesurteilstudien, pp. 52-53. no attempt to incorporate this device into Roman legal procedure. Only Azo, writing at Bologna about 1205, granted judicial duels the slightest attention.18 He definitely rejected them as legal proof, adopting as his authority Constantine's prescription against gladiatorial combats.'9 After 1215 the Glossa ordinaria of Accursius simply condemned them with theological arguments.20 The Romanists of the twelfth and early thirteenth centuries were preoccupied with the re-establishment of ancient Roman jurisprudence. To them full and clear legal proof consisted mainly of written instruments and witnesses. Some discussion persisted as to the precedence of these two means. Certain writers followed Justinian's preference for documents, others favored witnesses,2' but all of their discussions concerning proof were centered on the two factors.22 The Romanists realized, however, that full proof was not always possible. Azo stated plainly that in criminal cases when the plaintiff was not able to establish complete evidence the defendant was immediately acquitted, because it was preferable to allow the guilty to escape thani to punish unjustly the innocent.23 In civil cases the Romanists generally recognized a category of semi-complete proof which included certain kinds of evidence, such as presumptions, notoriety, or one witness, instead of two, which constituted full proof. In the case of certain semi-complete evidence the judge could assign an oath (iusiurandum, iuramentum, sacramentum) to one of the parties, and the case would be decided on the basis of that oath.24 Intricate rules were drawn up to determine whether the oath should be taken by the plaintiff or the defendant. By the time of Azo this judicial oath of the Romanists was called purgatio and contained marked similarities to the canonical purgation of the ecclesiastical courts. It is significant that within this fairly extensive scheme of full and semi-complete legal proof the Romanists of the twelfth and early thirteenth centuries made no mention of the contemporary practices of ordeals. One might say that, except for the bare references of Azo to Lombard duels, there was a conspiracy of silence against these non-Roman devices. 18 Azo, Lectura in codicem to armata vi: Cod. 4.10. During the twelfth and early thirteenth centuries an increasing amount of Roman law was incorporated into the legal system of the church. In the realm of precedure the canonists by 1215 had generally adopted the Romanist emphasis on written instruments and witnesses as principal means of proof. Where these means were lacking or insufficient the canonists possessed an ancient device known as purgation by oath or purgatio. The offer of an oath as evidence had its roots in the apostolic statement that "an oath for confirmation is to them an end of all strife"25 and was utilized particularly in cases involving the clergy. Ecclesiastical use of such purgation undoubtedly encouraged similar practices in Roman law, but in both systems of jurisprudence it was regarded only as a last resort after all means of full proof by documents and testimony had failed.26 On the other hand, the canonists fell heir to the practice of ordeals, which enjoyed the sanction of certain popes and councils in the past. Unlike the Romanists, the church lawyers were obliged to devote considerable attention to the problem.
The authoritative statements of the popes of the ninth century against ordeals were well known to the canonists of the twelfth century. Following the lead of the popes, the canonists of this period were on the whole hostile towards such customary practices. Ordeals were usually assigned to the category of purgations, that is, semi-complete proof only to be used when full proof was lacking. By the middle of the twelfth century they were termed common purgations (purgationes vulgares), i.e., originating from popular practice, to distinguish them from oaths or canonical purgations (purgationes canonicae), which arose from regular canonical tradition.27 Sometimes they were identified as iudicia peregrina or judgments foreign to the law of the church.28 Nonetheless, the collections of canon law contained a number of ancient canons and decretals permitting ordeals in certain cases. These statements were authoritative and could not be lightly dismissed. To the canonists therefore fell the task of reconciling these conflicting authorities. Moreover, certain popes and councils of the eleventh, twelfth, and early thirteenth centuries had countenanced such proofs on occasion, and the pressure of customary legal practices was still strong on the church. The problem of these conflicting sources and contemporary legal practices encouraged among the canon lawyers an attitude of hesitancy towards ordeals.
This cases involving the murder of a priest similarly designated purgation by oath for free men and ordeal by fire for serfs.40 Gratian's hesitancy was not merely a matter of assembling contradictory legal statements. After listing the decretal Consuluisti, which condemned hot iron and water proofs, Gratian asked whether this prohibition included all ordeals or merely the two specified.4' He then inserted a Scriptural quotation from Numbers v.12-28 which described a proof designed for jealous husbands to test the fidelity of their wives by means of bitter waters administered by priests.42 This Biblical example contained several features similar to an ordeal and thereby cast doubt on the universal character of the papal prohibition. Although Gratian's final judgment in this apparent conflict of authorities appears to have suppressed the Scriptural example in favor of the papal decree, nonetheless the whole question of these customary proofs was kept open.43 For the remainder of the twelfth century the Decretum of Gratian became the standard text of canon law. The canonists of this period devoted their writings to commenting on, teaching, and developing its main principles. In these works appeared the hesitations of the canonists engendered by conflicting texts and contemporary practice. As late as the 1160's the Summa Parisiensis was still considering Gratian's question whether the papal decrees against certain devices implied a general prohibition of all ordeals. In particular the author argued for the cold water trial.44 In a similar manner the Rhetorica ecclesiastica, also from Paris (1160-1180), merely listed the authorities pro and con without coming to a certain decision. 45 Strangely enough, the few types of customary proofs recognized by Gratian were generally disapproved by the consensus of later canonist opinion. The eucharistic ordeal, which was formerly permitted to monks, priests, and bishops, was ruled of no present force by a number of canonists beginning with Rufinus.46 Only the Parisian Summa: Tractaturus magister (1175-1191), generally more lenient towards customary practices than others, declared this proof more effective for establishing innocence than guilt.47 The divine judgment permitted in cases of adultery was considered abrogated by Rufinus and others. at Bologna (about 1188) simply interpreted the term "divine judgment" as ecclesiastical judgment by oath or witnesses.49 Perhaps.such opinions suggest that these particular ordeals had actually disappeared in practice. Finally, the anonymous Summa Coloniensis (about 1169) found that the Council of Tribur, which published the Palea Nobilis homo permitting hot iron and water trials for servile classes, was schismatic and hence not of great authority.50
When the canonists of the twelfth century turned to those ordeals, such as the hot iron, cold water, and judicial duel, which were commonly practiced but strongly censured by some canonical authorities, they made occasional qualifications and exceptions. For example, the Summa Parisiensis, the Rhetorica ecclesiastica, and the Summa Monacensis (1175-1178), also of the French school, explained that these proofs arose from customary practices.5' Stephen of Tournai and the Summa: Tractaturus maintained that they were instituted for deterring heinous crimes.52 For this reason ordeals, especially those of the unilateral kind, were to be limited to the servile classes according to Rufinus, Summa Monacensis, Tractaturus, and the Bolognese Bernard of Pavia (1191-1198).53 Finally, several of the canonists applied the Augustinian principle that no one should tempt God while he has rational means at his disposal. It could then be assumed that if rational means were not available, one might be justified in tempting God in certain cases.54 At Bologna Simon of Bisignano (1177-1179) seems to suggest that one tempted God in judicial duels only when rational deliberation was available.55 In a passage that is somewhat ambiguous the author of Tractaturus Because of the pressures of customary legal practice the church lawyers were forced to devote particular attention to the problem of judicial duels. The nature of these pressures is well illustrated by the career of the canonist Stephen of Tournai. In his Summa decretorum, written in the 1160's, Stephen made only a passing and neutral reference to the question of duels.57 But in 1179, when a dispute arose between himself, as abbot of Sainte-Genevieve of Paris, and his tenants of Rosny-sous-Vincennes over the nature of their personal services, Stephen took the case before the court of King Louis VII. In the absence of authentic charters the king ordered a judicial duel "according to the custom of the Franks." When the champions of the men of Rosny, frightened by those of Sainte-Genevieve, retired from the field, the king confirmed the servile services owed by the losers of the ordeal. The affair was witnessed by an imposing array of the Parisian clergy, including the abbots of Saint-Germain-des-Pres and SaintDenis and the dean and archdeacon of Notre Dame, and the decision was reconfirmed in charters from Popes Lucius III and Clement JJJ.58 In the twelfth and thirteenth centuries such an affair was not at all unusual in Paris.59
In general the canonists attributed the origin of judicial duels to customary or Lombard practices.60 While none would go as far as to permit unequivocally these manuscript and then adds the phrase: "unde actori debent negari sacramenta non reo qui invicus ad pugnam accedit."
11 "Est adinventio supersticiosa ubi certa est iuris censura, ut hic; necessaria ubi incerta ....
utilis: et hec dispensationis: minuendo ... provisionis: mutando ... rigoris: addendo.... Summa: Tractaturus magister to supersticiosa adinventione: C.2 q.5 c.20 Consuluisti, Paris Bibl. Nat. Lat. 15994, fol. 37rb. The ambiguity of the passage lies in the term censura iuris, which I have interpreted to mean the "judgment" or "verdict" of the case in order to harmonize this passage with the principles of Augustine. This interpretation is further substantiated because the author of Tractaturus himself later quotes the principles of Augustine in the same passage: "deum temptare. dum habent quid faciant, xxii q.ii queritur." 57 "Monomachiam, id est, singulare certamen duorum. Monos namque unum, machia pugna interpretatur." Stephen of Tournai, Summa to C.2 q.5 c.22 Monomachiam, Paris Bibl. Nat. Lat. 3912, fol. 42vb. This section, which is similar to that of Paucapalea (see below, n. 60), was omitted in the edition of Von Schulte. 58 Stephen of Tournai, Lettres, J. Tractaturus permitted them to ecclesiastics who exercised temporal rights.62 While the Parisian Summna Monacensis eventually rejected the legitimacy of battle under any circumstances, in the course of its discussion it enumerated a number of current arguments which would permit these trials in church as well as secular courts.63 Even if it were agreed that canonical authority generally made judicial duelling unlawful, there remained the special case of the defendant. What if one were accused in law and the plaintiff offered to prove his case by battle or the judge imposed this means of resolving the litigation? Although the accuser or the judge might be wrong, could it be said that the defendant was sinning mortally if he were forced to defend his cause or his person? This exception to the general prohibition against judicial duelling arose in the discussions of the canonists by the time of Huguccio in the late twelfth century, and it received sympathetic treatment from Bernard of Pavia and Alanus Anglicus . 64 Finally, 16 It is true that, after discussing exceptions to the general rule at considerable length, Bernard states that common purgations should not be admitted today with any person. But the attention devoted to the exceptions and a lack of specific refutation still indicates that they were important issues. Bernard of Pavia, Summa, v, 29, 30, pp. 259-260.
67 "In tanta canonumn dissonantia, non est mirum si magistrorum diverse sunt sententie." Summa: Elegantius in iure divino vernantia (Summa Coloniensis) to C.2, Paris Bibl. Nat. Lat. 14997, fol. 58r. This sentence is found in a passage which generally treats the canon Mennam. It is possible that the comment refers to the question of the number of oath helpers required in the canonical purgation of ecclesiastics which is also treated in the canon. 68 Peter of Blois, Speculum, c.16, pp. 40-41.
Among the canonists at Bologna during the twelfth century the greatest figure was Huguccio, and his Summa decretorum marked a highpoint in the development of canonistic jurisprudence. Not only did Huguccio consider invalid those canons which permitted certain kinds of ordeals, as we have already seen,69 but he also sharpened and reinforced the terminology of those authorities which attacked the customary practices.70 His significant contribution was to take up and answer at length some of the more important exceptions offered by previous canon lawyers to the general prohibitions. Many of these solutions were then adopted by succeeding writers. Similar to Gratian's problem of whether the canons which attacked specific ordeals could be applied generally to all ordeals was the question of whether new legal devices not covered by existing canonical authority should thereby be condoned. Against these exceptions Huguccio applied the legal principles that all is prohibited which is not explicitly commanded or permitted and that interpretations or exceptions not found in the canons are not to be admitted.71
To the more important distinction offered by the Summa: Tractaturus magister that customary proofs, although superstitious, may also be necessary, Huguccio replied at length. In a discussion perhaps influenced by the Summa Monacensis he defined the categories of superstitious, necessary, and useful. Ordeals were definitely relegated to the status of the superstitious because they were superfluous novelties created by new laws in an area already covered by canonical legislation. In contrast to other legal inventions which could be necessary or useful, these superstitious devices should be rejected.72 Concerning the more specific 72 "Non removet utilem vel necessariam adinventionem. Est enim triplex adinventio, scilicet, superstitiosa, necessaria, utilis. Superstitiosa est cum super id, de quo canones aliquid statuerunt, de novo aliquid superflue invenitur, et hoc fit duobus modis: scilicet, vel novum ius infaciendo, sicut est probatio ferri candentis vel aque ferventis, ut hic, vel vetus ius male interpretando.... Necessaria est cum super eo, de quo canones nichil dixerunt, aliquis de novo statuitur, sicut sepe fit a domino pape ad diversorum consultationes respondendo. Utilis est quando circa illud, de quo canones aliquid statuerunt, aliquid immutatur. Et hoc fit in tribus modis: vel corrigendo, ut cum aliquid per errorem introductum, postea per manifestationem veritatis corrigetur. .. vel detrahendo, ut cum aliquid de rigore iuris per misericordiam dispensative relaxatur . -. vel addendo, et hoc duppliciter: scilicet, vel addendo religioni ... vel addendo gravamini penarum. . . . Et nota quod adinventio que fit corrigendo dicitur correctionis, que fit detrahendo dicitur misericordie vel dispensationis, que fit addendo dicitur provisionis. Omnis ergo talis adinventio probatur. Preter superstitiosam hec enim reprobatur." Huguccio, Summa to superstitiosa: C.2 q.5 c.20 Consuluisti, Paris Bibl. Nat. Lat. 15396, fol. 114va. Prior to Huguccio the Summa Monacensis had discussed the problem in similar terms: question of judicial duels, Hugucecio followed the suggestion of the canon Monomachiam and disallowed any legal justification to be gained from the Biblical combat of David and Goliath. Their duel was permitted by special divine inspiration and, like the conduct of many Old Testament personages or more recent saints, their example should not set a precedent.73 Firmly convinced of the moral guilt of a plaintiff who voluntarily offered battle, Huguccio also turned to the more thorny question of the defendant faced with such a trial. Despite the penalty of automatic loss of one's cause, Huguccio urged the defendant not to submit to battle. Under no circumstances could judicial duels be justified by reason of customary or frequent practice, any more than fornication or usury. Why then, one may ask, does the pope know about and yet not disapprove of such trials? He may tolerate judicial duels in practice, concluded Huguccio, just as he tolerates prostitutes and usurers in Rome, but this does not justify these practices in law. 74 In his answers to these practical questions Huguccio represents the "Adinventio quedam est superstitiosa, quedam neccesaria, quedam utilis. Superstitiosa quando id quod canonibus sufficienter statutum est, aliquis novitate quadam ostentationis aut presumptionis causa immutare querit, ut de ista vulgari purgatione que fit aqua vel igne. Necesaria est illa adinventio que eam rem, super qua nihil cautum est lege vel canone, novum aliquid constituendo diffinivit. Utilis est illa que ius pridem constitutuim cum cause cognitione aliquatenus immutat addendo vel detrahendo aut commutando. Et ipsa triplex est nam aut est misericordie aut veritatis aut accelerate provisionis: quandoque enim misericordie causa a generali iure recedimus per dispensationem, quandoque veritate manifestata quod per errorem male constitutum erat corrigitur, quandoque pena legibus inserta pravitas hominun non reprimitur. Ideoque penis aliud addendum nova consti- which he took characteristic personal interest. Perhaps his interest was prompted by the contemporary French school of canonists represented by the authors of the Summa Monacensis, Summa Parisiensis, Summa: Tractaturus magister, and Rhetorica ecclesiastica, who were having difficulties in taking a rigorous stand against these customary practices. We have evidence that at least one student either heard the lectures or at least knew the work of both the Chanter and the author of the Rhetorica ecclesiastica.8' Often Peter was consulted at Paris in specific cases involving moral questions. We have the report of a man who was acused of murder and against whom there were strong presumptions. Offered the chance of clearing himself by the cold water trial, he soughl the counsel of the Chanter. Peter advised him not to submit to the test and was rewarded for his good advice by seeing the unhappy defendant carted off to the gibbet. 16 Peter the Chanter, Verbum, ch. 78, P.L., ccv, 226-233 (first version) and 542-;548 (third version). 87 The importance of the Chanter has been recognized by Leitmaier, Die Kirche, pp. 66-68 and especially Nottarp, Gottesurteilstudien, p. 360.
In the domain of moral theology Peter the Chanter considered ordeals clearly unlawful by Scriptural authority contained in both the Old and New Testaments: "Thou shalt not tempt the Lord thy God" (Deut. vi. 16 and Matt. iv. 7).88 Ordeals require the miraculous intervention of God into the regular affairs of judicial procedure and constitute a flagrant tempting of God. As an exegete Peter demonstrated how a number of Biblical passages may not be interpreted to justify these customary proofs.89 More important, he was obliged to explain how the numerous instances of divine intervention in the Old Testament did not constitute precedents for ordeals. For example, the Mosaic test of bitter waters for adultery, which caused Gratian so much trouble, was interpreted by Peter as a specific divine concession to the malice of the Jews, just as God had conceded the right of divorce.90 The well-known miraculous stories of the Bible represent the privileges of a few and not general law.9' Although miracles are certainly possible in our day, they are not always necessary, and therefore, ordeals are wrong because they constantly demand miracles in their administration.92 God's promises of intervention apply only to the righteous and our present sins hinder the effectiveness of miracles today.93 In general the New Testament has abrogated the ordeals of the Old.94
Although in theory Peter the Chanter condemned ordeals as immoral, it was from the realm of experience and practice that he drew the greater part of his arguments. According to the Scripture (Deut. xviii. 20, 21), if a man claims to be a prophet of God and prophesies a certain event and that event does not come to pass, that man is to be killed as a deceiver.95 Applying this empirical, test, the Chanter found ordeals wanting. To him it was a fact that customary trials often produced false judgments. In opposition to the vast mediaeval store of accounts drawn from popular lore and saints' lives which illustrated the effectiveness of miraculous ordeals, Peter began to collect accounts showing how these devices did not work.96 Throughout his writings he delighted in telling anecdotes of the failures of ordeals. For example, Pope Alexander III once lost one of his precious vessels and forced a certain suspect to undergo the proof of the hot iron. The man was unfortunate, lost the judgment, and was compelled to make restitution, 88 Peter the Chanter, Verbum, 2926A and 542C. 89 Ibid., 9-28D and 544D; 231D and 547D; 544A. 90 "Item hinc habemus argumentum quod sortes et huiusmodi probationes aque et ferri candentis licite sunt. Quod non est trahendum ad consequenciam, quia facta legis ammiranda et sepelienda sunt ad opera, nisi fuerunit moralia. Vel sustinuit hoc fieri dominus propter iudeorum maliciam ut libellum repudii." Peter the Chanter, Commentary to Num. v, Paris, Arsenal 44, p. 227b and Oxford, Balliol Col. 23, fol. 14ra.
9' Peter the Chanter, Verbum, 2927C and 543D. 92 Ibid., 228A. 93 Ibid., 228B and 543D. 94 Ibid., 546C. 95 Ibid., 226B and 542D. 96 For one of the larger collections in English of stories illustrating the efficacy of ordeals, see that irdefatigable compiler of anecdotes, Henry C. Lea, Superstition and Force (Philadelphia, 1878), ch. ii and iii. but more unfortunate was the pope when the stolen vessel was later found in the hands of the true thief.97 A similar case happened in Orleans, but this time the falsely convicted victim was hanged before the true thief was discovered.98 Perhaps the most striking case was the story of two English pilgrims who were returning from Jerusalem. The one diverted his path to the shrine of Saint James of Compostella; the other, on arriving home first, found himself accused by his former companion's kinsmen of having murdered him. He was put to the water test, failed, and was promptly hanged. To the amazement of all, the "murdered" companion returned home shortly thereafter.99
Another argument from experience was based on the manner in which ordeals were administered. In trial by battle the participants invariably chose their champions according to skill in arms. Why didn't they choose aged and decrepit men to demonstrate clearly the miracle?'00 It is no marvel that of three men accused of the same crime and therefore compelled to carry the same hot iron, the last man has the best chance to prove his innocence. Innocence is too closely connected with calluses !101 Perhaps the cold water probe was susceptible to greatest manipulation. Controversy prevailed as to the standard of judging innocence. Must the victim sink to the bottom or merely be totally submerged? Some contended that his hair need not be submerged because this did not constitute the substance of his body. A participant could be taught to blow out the air from his mouth and nose and thus sink. Finally, there was the case of the father compelled to defend his inheritance by such means through one of his sons. He privately confided to the Chanter that he had tested all of his sons before the ordeal and found one that was certain to win.102 In a manner which anticipated the discussions of the Emperor Frederick II, Peter concluded that it was only reasonable to respect the natural properties of heat and water and not to expect through them the demonstration of the miraculous.103
If miraculous proofs were effective, queried the Chanter, why were they not used by the church in important affairs? Despite certain Biblical precedents, prelates and popes, on whom depend the salvation of their charges, are not chosen through lots but through the more rational procedure of election.'04 Through a single trial of the hot iron would not the church be able to prove the truth of its faith and convert the unbelievers? Peter cited the incident of a severe drought 97 "Tamen alexander iii amiserat vas preciosum et cogit quendam suspectum purgare se iudicio ferri candentis. Ipse incidit in iudicium et cogebatur reddere usque ad novissimum quadrantem. Postea inventum est vas illud in manu alterius et compertum est priorem omino fuisse immunem. Percussit alexander iii pectus suum dicens: Bone iesu! quis diabolus decepit me ut ego miser [usus sim] diabolico illo iudicio?" Peter the Chanter, Summa, Paris Bibl. Nat. Lat. 14521, fol. 154rb and va. 98 Peter the Chanter, Verbum, 230C and 546C. 99 Ibid., 230D, 231A, and 547A.
that afflicted the city of Reims. In solemn procession the faithful of both sexes and all ranks carried the sacred relics around the city to gain divine favor and relief from the drought. When not the slightest cloud appeared after three days, the leader of the synagogue proposed that the Jewish torah be paraded in a similar manner. If after three days rain did not fall, the Jewish community would embrace Christianity. A number of the faithful were disposed to accept the challenge, but Master Albericus of Reims put a stop to the whole matter. Even the seductive prospect of converting the Jewish community, he contended, did not justify jeopardizing the true faith through such presumptuous means. For similar reasons Peter concluded that the church cannot entrust its position to the uncertainties of the hot iron.'05 To be consistent the Chanter had to oppose the use of ordeals in the trial of heretics. How can the heart, where matters of faith lie, be examined by such proofs? He deplored the practice of the princes and prelates who took no notice of the confession of orthodox faith of an accused heretic but demanded the hot iron trial. Such a case happened at Paris in the presence of the king, princes, and prelates of France. The accused consented to bear the hot iron to confirm his orthodox beliefs only if the assembled churchmen could assure him that this act would not tempt God. Despite the protests of a certain Cistercian monk, Gerardus, the prelates kept their silence, and the man was speedily assigned to the flames. In general Peter vigorously opposed the death penalty in convictions of heresy; rather, he approved of the example of Samson, archbishop of Reims (1140-1161), who merely imprisoned a confessed Manichean in order to prevent him from contaminating the faithful. The combined effect of proof by ordeals and an immediate death penalty produced many abuses in the treatment of accused heretics. Cathari were not granted the customary reprieve of thirty days to reconsider their errors, and decent women in Flanders who refused to yield to the lusts of priests were inscribed in the records as Cathari and immediately executed.'06
Peter the Chanter underscored the essential relationship between the practice of ordeals and the church. Churches lend relics and books for the consecration of the elements, and churchmen contribute the sanction of their presence.107 As a matter of fact, without the priesthood ordeals would not be possible.'08 The obvious line of the Chanter's attack was to prohibit the clergy from any participation in these affairs. Peter had the support of canonical tradition, which forbade the participation of clerics in any affair immediately involving the shedding 105 Ibid., 229C and 546A,B. of blood. Clearly, then, priests are forbidden to extend their blessing to judicial duels, where the shedding of blood is inevitable.109 He specifically complained about the custom of permitting champions to attend mass, although not to communicate, before the conflict. How can this practice be justified when each participant has the intent to kill his opponent? No exception should be made for the defendant who also harbors this intention and should therefore be excluded from the divine offices."' Particularly vexing was the custom of holding judicial duels in cases involving serfs in the very courtyard of the archdeacon of Paris. The Chanter's reply to this practice would be unmistakable if it were not for the sanction of Pope Eugenius III, who permitted it on the basis of custom."1 Canonical tradition further prohibited the participation of clerics in any judgment which eventually resulted in the shedding of blood. Archbishop Samson of Reims, although permitting the single practice of the water ordeal, forbade any clerical participation unless the temporal authorities furnished guarantees that the affair would not result in mutilation or the shedding of blood.'12 The Chanter constantly warned the clergy about the relationship between ordeals and the shedding of blood.'13 In a practical manner priests tend not to remain neutral 109 Ibid., 282C.
110 "Preterea hodie est consuetudo quod campionibus conducticiis non datur eucharistia. Audiunt tamen missam antequam pugnent, et si alter occidatur in duello arcetur a terra benedicta. Que est ista particularis consuetudo [mss. communio] quod iste recipiebatur prius ad missam modo arcetur a sepultura? Forte fit ad terrorem. Item: si aliquis pugnaret pro capite suo defendendo, ita quod necessario oporteret eum mori vel se defendere, dubitarem an ei, si peteret, esset danda eucharistia, quia vix posset pugnare contra aliquem ad mortem nisi haberet fraternum odium quod est peccatum in spiritum sanctum. Tamen tales confitentur sacerdotibus. Unde mirum est quod consilium dent eis sacerdotes, cum impenitentibus penetentia non debeat iniungi. Ipsi autem impenitentes sunt, cum habeant propositum et voluntatem occidendi." Peter the Chanter, Summa, Troyes 276, fol. 122vb, and Paris Bibl. Nat. Lat. 9593, fol. 1461a.
111 "Item: quedam ecclesie habent monomachias et iudicant monomachiam debere fieri quandoque inter rusticos suos. Et faciunt eos pugnare in curia ecelesie in atrio episcopi vel archidiaconi, sicut fit parisius. De quo consultus papa eugenius respondit: Utimini consuetudine vestra. Sed cum clericus indicat monomachiam debere fieri, ex qua sequitur dampnatio alterius et mors, nonne cum iudicat ad antecedens, iudicat ad consequens? Scio quid dicerem, nisi papa ita respondisset." Peter the Chanter, Summa, Troyes 276, fol. 140Va and Paris Bibl. Nat. Lat. 9598, fol. 164ra. This passage was noticed by J. LeBeuf, tlistoire de la ville de Paris (Paris, 1888), i, 9-10. See n. 122 below.
112 Peter the Chanter, Verbum, 280A and 545B. Samson did forbid, however, the hot iron trial. "I Ibid., 227B and 548C. "Sicut etiam dicitur in decretis quod iudex ecclesiasticus non debet discutere de crimine seculari ad delegationem principis nisi prius princeps prestiterit iuratoriam cautionem quodsi ille qui accusatur iudicetur reus ab ecclesiastico iudice, et non condempnet eum ultimo iudicio. A simili videtur nobis quod etiam si peregrina ista iudicia vera essent, non deberet ecclesiastica persona interesse vel ministerium suum exibere, nisi prius prestita cautione de indempnitate corporis, si incideret reus in iudicium, sed traderetur in perpetuum carcerem, vel proscriberetur, vel exheredaretur, vel alio modo sine sanguine puniretur." Peter the Chanter, Summa, Paris Bibl. Nat. Lat. 14521, fol. 154va. "Item: constat quod omnia peregrina iudicia, ut iudicium aque frigide vel ferri candentis et similia, a diabolo sunt inventa. Nonne peccat ergo sacerdos benedicens aquam aut ferrum? Nonne ipse prebet ministerium suum ad effusionem sanguinis? Preterea si accusaret sacerdos aliquem ad mortem in hoc solo peccaret quod accusaret. Nunc autem dupliciter peccat quia prestat auctoritatem suam illi iudicio diabolico, et quia per ministerium suum ita facit hominem mori sicut si accusaret eum. Cum enim accusat, incertus est hinc inde utrunm dampnabitur throughout the procedure of the ordeal, but to become involved in the decision and thereby implicated in the condemnation."4 Just as one, sins by furnishing the occasion for fornication, so priests are guilty who bless the customary proofs which eventually produce the shedding of blood. Neither can the frequency of the practice remove the blame any more than in the case of adultery.1"5
Peter the Chanter approved of the example of Archbishop Samson as far as it went, but he himself went further by holding that priests were forbidden to participate in ordeals even when there was no chance of the eventual shedding of blood."16 By the unequivocal removal of the priesthood, he hoped to deal a final blow to the practice of ordeals. Despite the contrary examples of populace, priests, and popes, the Chanter's position was clear: "Even if the universal church under penalty of anathema commanded me as a priest to bewitch the iron or bless the water, I would quicker undergo the perpetual penalty than perform such a thing." 117 Not all of Peter's theological colleagues at Paris shared his unequivocal attitude towards the ordeals. It is true that Radulphus Ardens, probably inspired by Peter himself, came out strongly against them in his Speculum universale The first was an unhappy case, similar to the one with which the Chanter dealt, of a man accused of murder who suffered martyrdom for the cause of resisting ordeals.12' The second involved a perplexing situation faced by a bishop who held the rights of both spiritual and temporal justice and before whom was brought a man of importance accused by public notoriety of a gross crime, such as heresy. The bishop could not convict the accused through normal means. Because of his great influence no one would personally testify against him. On the other hand, the bishop could not dismiss the case because of the great presumptions involved and because of the scandal of appearing to submit to bribery. The recourse to canonical purgations or the swearing of seven compurgators was held of no popular repute, and common purgation through ordeals was forbidden by the canons. Robert offered two solutions. On the basis of public defamation the bishop could imprison the accused on bread and water until enough evidence or a confession had been secured to produce a conviction, and thus popular opinion would be satisfied. Or the bishop could offer purgation through an ordeal, on the grounds that when no legitimate proof was available, such means did not constitute a tempting of God. In support of the second alternative Robert cited the responses of Pope Alexander III to Bishop Baldwin of Noyon (1167-1175), including the decretal Ad abolendam, which advised the bishop to follow the custom of the realm in such cases, although Robert conceded that this advice evoked great scandals.122 The third case was similar to the first and involved the dilemma of a censent sacri canones. Quod autem legibus diffinitum non est superstitiosis; non sunt presumenda adinventionibus." Magister Martinus, Summa, Paris Bibl. Nat. priest faced on one hand with pressure from his temporal and spiritual superiors and the custom of the land to bless the ordeals, and on the other, with the knowledge of their immoral nature. Again Robert's eventual solution to the dilemma was to accede to the force of custom sanctioned by the decretal Ad abolendam.'23
These three cases present not the determined opposition and rigorous consistency of the master, Peter the Chanter, but rather the perplexities reminiscent of the canonists of the twelfth century. In 1212 Pope Innocent III rewarded Robert with the cardinal's hat and later commissioned him as papal legate in France to preach the crusade, reform the church, and prepare for the great Lateran Council of 1215. When presiding over the Councils of Paris (1212) and Rouen (1214), Robert did not come out fully against ordeals but merely banished them from cemeteries and other sacred places. '24 Perhaps the debate over the question of ordeals in the faculties of canon law and theology at Bologna and Paris was reflected in the hesitant attitude of Pope Innocent III during the early years of his pontificate. At some point prior to 1215, however, Innocent made up his mind definitely against these practices and declared himself unmistakably in the Fourth Lateran Council. Was there any relaSed quid si offerat se ad iudicium ferri vel aque, contra canones que illi detestantur? Solutio: in tali articulo non debet prelatus dimittere talem et tam [sic?] infamem. Immo tam vehemens potest esse presumptio contra ipsum, quod non debeat dimittere, sed inter duos muros in aqua tribulantionis et pane angustie, tam diu recludere quo usque aliquis ad eius accusationem accedat vel quo usque crimen confiteatur, et peniteat vel aliquam condignam purgationem subeat, ut populo vel eccelsie satisfaciat. *Respondeo: si ipse iudicium ferri vel aque petat, officialis episcopi ei non debet denegare. Videlicet ubi nullum aliud invenitur remedium, quia tunc non temptatur deus, quia papa alexander fertur respondisse balduino noviomensi episcopo petenti quid fieret de talibus. Sequere consuetudinem regni. Respondeo: hoc [sic?] elicitur ex illa decretali, Ad abolendam. Hec de scandalo et de omni diversitate scandalorum dicta sufficiant." Ibid., Paris Bibl. Nat. Lat. 3259, fol 113ra-va. At this point (*) the scribe protested with a marginal comment: "alii dicunt contrarium." I have not been able to find either this decretal of Alexander III or that of Eugenius III (see n. 111 above) in the printed collections of papal decretals. Communications from Professor J. Ramackers of Aachen and Professor Walther Holtzmann of Rome advise me that the texts of these decretals have yet to be discovered. tion between his final decision and the teaching at the universities? It is, of course, possible that he read or was influenced by the works of Peter of Blois, Huguccio, Peter the Chanter, or perhaps others, but it is also highly probable that the influence of these men was more direct. Although much of Innocent's life prior to his elevation to the papacy remains unknown, we do know that as a young man Lothario di Segni studied at Rome, Paris, and Bologna. 125 Apparently at Bologna between 1187 and 1189 he read law with such masters as Bernard of Pavia and, especially, Huguccio. Later, as pope, he expressed his gratitude to his former teachers by conferring on them ecclesiastical dignities; Huguccio he raised to the see of Ferrara.'26 Very likely the great canonist's theories influenced the pope on the subject of ordeals as they did in other areas. Prior to 1187 Lothario prepared himself in philosophy and theology at the schools of Paris, where, he later confessed, he had received the gift of knowledge.'27 His one acknowledged master of theology at Paris was Peter of Corbeil, to whom he, as Pope Innocent III, later granted the archbishopric of Sens (1900) . 128 Peter was known especially for his Scriptural studies, but unfortunately none of his academic works has so far been identified. 129 It is also known that while at Paris Lothario was acquainted with Robert of Courson, Stephen Langton, and Jean de Toucy (afterwards abbot of Sainte-Genevieve, 1192-1222). The position of Robert on ordeals was uncertain; the other two are not known to have discussed the matter. The important question is whether Lothario knew Peter the Chanter and his work. As pope from 1198 to 1216 Innocent made no direct mention of Peter, but the Chanter was already dead by 1197. Lothario was certainly in Paris (a few years before 1187) at a time when Peter was at the height of his academic career, exercising then the dignity of chanter of Notre Dame (by at least 1184). Peter gave to the question of ordeals the fullest treatment of the twelfth century. His consistent and rigorous opposition to these practices contrasted markedly with the perplexities of many of his colleagues in the faculties of canon law and theology. Of greater significance, the Chanter emphasized two aspects of the problem which also dominated the formulation of Innocent's decrees in the Lateran Council of 1215. Both the Chanter and the Pope clearly related the practice of ordeals to the question of clerical involvement in affairs which resulted in the shedding of blood, and both centered their attack against these abuses by energetically prohibiting further participation to the clergy. Is it not possible that Innocent was first influenced by the Chanter's teachings at Paris, later received confirmation and legal clarification from Huguccio at Bologna, and finally after a period of hesitation translated these principles into action in Canon 18 of the Lateran Council of 1215? Huguccio's influence on Innocent is more certain, but the Chanter's remains a strong probability. In the light of the circumstantial evidence and with the absence of significant alternatives, might we hazard the conclusion that Peter the Chanter, theologian at Paris, and Huguccio, canonist at Bologna, were the moving spirits behind the canon of 1215 which marked the beginning of the end of ordeals in European society? THE JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY
